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a b s t r a c t
A skillful early detection and warning system for severe and/or abrupt climate change would beneﬁt both
adaptation and preparedness. But what would a severe climate change early warning system look like?
Important characteristics of dangerous climate shifts, like rate of onset, intensity, spatial distribution, and
predictability, are little known but are the subject of growing research efforts. Some ad hoc forms of
climate early warnings are already emerging, and attention now to lessons, positive and negative, from
existing hazard warning systems would seem prudent. The nature of warnings for hazards like
hurricanes, volcanoes, and asteroids is examined for lessons relevant to a climate change early detection
and warning system. An initial analysis of the relationships among lead time, warning, and response for
different proﬁles of severe and abrupt climate change is offered.
& 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Contents
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Warnings of climate change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Lessons from extant early warning systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The event: what is it? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Location: where is it? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Timing: when is it?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Lessons for climate warning systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Some dimensions of a severe climate change early warning system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
What: the climate element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
When: warning lead time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Where: location. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Conclusion: next steps in climate change early warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Introduction
Natural and anthropogenic climate change could yield a
range of threats to social well-being, from severe, abrupt events,
like sharply colder epochs (e.g., the Little Ice Age) or strings
of heat waves, to irreversible long-term trends like ice sheet
disintegration (Arnell et al., 2005; Schellnhuber et al., 2006).
Most of the contemporary concern about extreme climate change
is associated with anthropogenic global warming (AGW) (Hansen
et al., 2012). Concern that mitigation cannot keep global warming
below dangerous levels (Arnell et al., 2005; Parry et al., 2009;
Schneider, 2009; New et al., 2011) leads logically to calls for more
attention to adaptation (Kates et al., 2012), and even to potential
geo-engineering interventions, at least to slow the warming
and allow mitigation and adaptation to take hold, “just in case”
we face climate emergencies (Schneider, 2008; The Royal Society,
2009; National Research Council, 2010). Both adaptation and
geo-engineering would need information and decision support
(National Research Council, 2009), such as systems that could
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detect and warn about impending severe changes in the climate
system (e.g., ice sheet collapse, regional ﬂips to more arid climates,
etc.) with some skill and at some policy-relevant lead time (Lenton
et al., 2008; Lenton, 2011).
At ﬁrst glance the notion of creating a system for warning
about impending severe climatic changes might seem far-fetched,
as well as fraught with ambiguity. The population of potentially
severe climate sequences, their magnitudes, rates of onset, and
geographical distribution of impacts, are as yet poorly discerned.
But, in some ways we already receive “warnings” of climate
change via the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), and more compelling communications such as full-
length ﬁlms (Gore, 2006). Yet most extant warning systems attend
to discrete, short-term events, like ﬂoods, tornadoes, or hurri-
canes, and climate change seems out of place in this line-up of
recurring phenomena. Moreover, in a changing climate one would
expect that warning systems already in place for atmospheric
hazards like severe storms and heat waves would accommodate
changing frequency and intensities of extremes with more (or
fewer) warnings as underlying climate change increases (or
decreases) their frequency.
As concerns about speciﬁc severe and/or abrupt changes in the
climate system increase (National Research Council, 2002; Lenton
et al., 2008; Schellnhuber et al., 2006), worries about limits on
adaptive capacity endure (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010), and ideas
emerge for intervening in global warming through geo-
engineering at least as a last resort (Cicerone, 2006), it seems
inevitable that some form of climate change early warning system
will develop. The broad experience in hand with current hazard
warning systems, the awkward history of systems that evolved
haphazardly over time, and the complexity of the prediction and
warning enterprise, all point to the value of assessing that
experience and examining its applicability to severe climate
change before we ﬁnd ourselves with a de facto, poorly perform-
ing climate change warning system. This review applies lessons
from the extant hazards warnings experience to the climate
change problem.
Warnings of climate change
Without design, and with little fanfare, the global community is
awash in communications about severe climate change. Some of
this alarm is quite deliberately targeted at raising concern (e.g.,
Gore, 2006), but much of it is simply the extension of climate
scenarios used to explore future impacts of rapid global warming.
Most global change analysts do not think of products like maps of
areas to be inundated as sea levels rise, projections of future water
shortages, or altered ﬂood return intervals, as warnings per se. Yet
the terminology of hazard warning systems is creeping into global
change discourse, even in academic articles (Lenton, 2011). And
though no formalized climate change warning system exists, some
forms of climate projections already look like warnings. The most
warning-like is the “Reasons for Concern” (RFC) diagram (Fig. 1)
in the IPCC's third assessment report (Smith et al., 2001, p. 958),
up-dated, without the graphic, in AR4's Synthesis Report (IPCC,
2007a, pp. 19–20), and up-dated graphically, to quite dramatic
visual effect, in Smith et al. (2009).
The RFC graphic is strongly imbued with warning-like icono-
graphy: Smith et al. use a long-standing visual warning technique
of graded coloration from yellow to red to indicate increasing
likelihood of the event (at a given threshold of global mean
temperature, GMT, rise above a circa 1990 baseline). They also
choose red to indicate the worst outcomes, as warning convention
dictates, and they increase the color saturation to indicate higher
“level of risk,” though they do not specify whether the term risk is
used technically, as a product of likelihood and consequence, or
colloquially, as likelihood. Indeed, many aspects of the RFC are
enigmatic: it mixes the notion of risk implied by the color
saturation and risk anchored by the different polar dimension
labels inside each column, some of which redundantly infer risk
(e.g., “risk to some” vs. “risk to many”) or impact (positive to
negative). This makes interpretation difﬁcult; for example the “risk
of large-scale discontinuities” was shifted to a lower GMT in the
2009 version, according to the red coloration, but the “high” risk
label remained ﬁxed at the top of the column, in the 4–5 1C range.
Fig. 1. “Reasons for Concern” graphic depicted in the IPCC Third Assessment Report as up-dated by the authors. The graphic takes on many of the qualities of a warning icon
including color coding in which red means more risky. From Smith et al. (2009). Assessing dangerous climate change through an update of the intergovernmental panel on
climate change (IPCC) ‘reasons for concern’.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci, 106, 4133–4137. National Academy of Sciences, USA. Used with permission.
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If the reader were to compare the two versions, the red bar would
appear to be shifting toward the “low” risk pole, surely not what
the authors wished to convey.
In these ways the RFC graphs exemplify common challenges
with risk communication that afﬂict all warning systems, espe-
cially when boiled down to a single graphic. By attempting to
convey multiple dimensions that they consider important, the
authors increase, rather than decrease, message ambiguity. Such
communication problems show up in many warning systems,
a good example being the forecast “cones” shown for hurricanes
and meant to convey uncertainty of future location, a depiction
that is routinely misinterpreted (Broad et al., 2007). Similar,
awkward trade-offs among probability, time period, and intensity
infect many hazard warning systems. Still, improvement and
expansion of early warning systems is seen as an important
component of efforts to reduce disaster impacts and to adapt
society to extremes (IPCC, 2012).
The latest incarnation of “Key Impacts” charts employed in the
IPCC's AR4 summary for policymakers, illustrating impacts arrayed
against GMT (IPCC, 2007b, p. 16), also appear quite like warning
messages. Parry et al. (2008) strengthened this by overlaying lines
projecting impacts at different future times based on assumptions
about GHG emission reductions. Thus Parry et al. (2008) complete
the triplet of elements one would expect in a warning system:
what, when and where, the latter made explicit in versions of the
“Key Effects” graphs for regionally-speciﬁc impacts (wildﬁre areas,
permafrost thaw depths, etc.).
By linking GMT rise to speciﬁc impacts and future conditions,
both the RFC and Key Impacts graphics become nascent warning
messages, but with the warning contingent on GHG mitigation
policy. This separates the current state of global warming projec-
tions from extant natural hazard warnings in which the geophy-
sical event is not subject to human intervention. Climate scenarios
in the IPCC and other assessments (e.g., Meehl et al., 2007) are
typically couched not as forecasts or predictions per se, but as
projections based on scenarios of future climate forcing. Thus
these geo-physical projections have the unusual quality that they
are designed to lay out a potential future so that action can be
taken now to negate the projection. As Parry et al. (2008) noted,
until recently it was considered “defeatist” to interpret global
warming projections as future conditions expected actually to
verify, for which to prepare, as opposed to outcomes that could
and should be prevented by changing human behavior and
technology. But, as soon as someone or some group with cred-
ibility offers a raw probability of reaching a certain temperature at
a certain time, the world will suddenly have a climate change
forecast per se, and, by implication, a warning. The MIT Joint
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change (Sokolov et al.,
2009) is very close to doing this, and offers a global warming
“roulette wheel” that also resembles a warning system (see: http://
globalchange.mit.edu/gamble/more).
Lessons from extant early warning systems
Natural hazard warning systems include detection, analysis,
prediction, and then warning dissemination followed by response
decision-making and implementation (Mileti, 1999; Sorensen,
2000; Basher, 2006; Glantz, 2009; Bernard et al., 2006). Systems
are in place, in many parts of the world, to monitor, forecast, and
warn people about tropical cyclones, ﬂoods, winter storms, tsu-
nami, avalanches, tornadoes, severe thunderstorms, volcanic erup-
tions, and extreme heat and cold (Zschau and Küppers, 2003;
Glantz, 2009). Given limits on predictability, some of these
systems stress real-time detection and now-casting (“warn on
detection”) while others are based explicitly on forecasts (“warn
on prediction”), hopefully with some skill above chance or clima-
tology and with sufﬁcient lead time to be useful. All systems
struggle with similar challenges in specifying: (1) the physical
nature and magnitude of the event and its impacts; (2) location;
and (3) timing and duration, as would a climate change warning
system.
The event: what is it?
Research has shown persistent differences between what
technical analysts and the public envision as the predicted event
or conditions described in formal warning messages (Sorensen,
2000). Even something as obvious as a hurricane warning can be
interpreted as portending wind, storm surge, freshwater ﬂooding,
and even tornadoes (Broad et al., 2007). Most hazards are indeed
ensembles of elements; a single volcano can threaten lava ﬂows,
pyroclastic and mud ﬂows, ash fall, aviation ash hazard, landslides,
and earthquakes. Decision-makers want speciﬁcity, which has
forced warnings to elaborate into details like storm surge heights
along speciﬁc segments of coastline, rainfall rates at the resolution
of small watersheds, and even the likely size of hailstones.
Any early warning of a climate tip, even one couched in, say,
continental or hemispheric terms, would evoke demand for
information on its manifestation in conditions relevant to speciﬁc
locations and individual decision-makers. Under this pressure,
climate warnings might be expected to evolve as have tsunami
alerts: the tsunami warning system in the Paciﬁc Ocean has
evolved from general statements about arrival times and rough
notions of wave size, to attempts to translate the relatively easily-
predicted propagation of a wave across the ocean into the much
more difﬁcult prediction of likely wave heights and run-up
distances at selected coastlines and even particular embayments,
each of which responds differently to the wave train (Bernard
et al., 2006).
Location: where is it?
Ambiguities in traditional warning messages about location
(e.g., ﬂooding of “low lying areas”) have been reduced with details
allowed by Geographic Information Systems (GIS), high-resolution
models like storm surge simulations (see, for example: http://
www.nhc.noaa.gov/surge/HistoricalRuns/), and address-speciﬁc
advisory systems. But the science cannot always deliver the
geographic speciﬁcity that decision-makers want, and many warn-
ing systems still issue geographically-broad advisories, especially
at longer lead times, due to uncertainty and an aversion to under-
warning. Long segments of coastlines and large polygons of
territory are routinely warned about severe weather; tsunami
alerts still go out at the ocean basin and continental scale. Over-
warning is typical. Nevertheless, the geographic scope of events
sometimes surprise analysts: a roughly concentric evacuation zone
was designated around the volcano Mt. Ste. Helens when it
became active in 1980, but the volcano eventually sent a lateral
blast beyond the evacuation area to the north (Lipman and
Mullineaux, 1981).
Timing: when is it?
Warning systems involve trade-offs among reliability, skillful
lead time, and desired lead time for social response, factors that
depend substantially on rate of hazard onset. All warning systems
struggle with an inverse relationship between lead time and
accuracy, and with the difﬁcult balance of type I and type II errors
(e.g., forecasters have to worry both about false positives, that
yield over-warning, and false negatives, that yield under-pre-
paredness). Limits on forecast skill restrict warnings mostly to
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categorical expression in two to three tiers typiﬁed by the well-
known “watch” and “warning” vernacular applied to many atmo-
spheric hazards. “Warning” is usually reserved for imminent, high
conﬁdence impact. Only a very few systems, in limited locales,
include probabilistic information to convey uncertainty (e.g.,
hurricane strike probabilities; (see Sheets, 1985; Willoughby
et al., 2007).
Earthquakes anchor the low forecast skill/rapid onset end of
the spectrum, and the few extant earthquake warning systems are
based on real-time detection, and transmission of alerts faster
than the damaging waves travel in order to provide a few seconds
or minutes of warning (Allen et al., 2009). Winter storms,
hurricanes, and riverine ﬂoods offer relatively high skill and
medium lead times (hours to days). Some volcano eruptions, heat
waves, and droughts offer less forecast skill but relatively long
hazard onset, thus allowing useful, long-term now-casting, up-
dated as conditions change.
A solid body of research has demonstrated the trade-offs
between skill and lead time in weather forecasts (Thompson,
1963; Thompson and Brier, 1955; Murphy, 1977, 1994; Katz and
Murphy, 1997; Stern and Easterling, 1999), and these insights will
be useful in designing climate warning. Some analyses yield
counter-intuitive results: Murphy and Ehrendrofer (Murphy and
Ehrendorfer, 1987) showed that decision cases exist where
increased accuracy does not yield increased value (see also
Millner, 2009). The added beneﬁt of improved hurricane forecast-
ing that allows, say, smaller areas to be warned 24 h in advance of
landfall, may be discounted by the decision-maker given their
dread of a hurricane hitting an area that was not warned at least
24 h in advance (though little research exist to illuminate this
widely-asserted risk aversion; for a review see Lindell et al. (2007).
In many traditional warning situations, costs and losses do not
follow the same subjective utility function (Letson et al., 2007),
and we simply have little insight yet into how such relationships
would obtain in warnings of rapid, severe climate transitions.
Warning systems have, logically, focused on high-impact
hazards, for which decision-makers want as much preparation
time as possible, thus there is pressure to extend lead times. Useful
lead time depends on the decision context: the timing of some
“go” decisions, like evacuating a city in front of a hurricane, is
determined by factors (e.g., population and transportation routes)
unrelated to the scientiﬁc forecast problem (Baker, 2000; Lindell
et al., 2007). But extending lead times almost certainly yields more
false positive errors (Pielke and Carbone, 2002). Finally there is the
problem of how extant systems will perform if climate change
alters the behavior of the extreme events about which they were
designed to warn.
Lessons for climate warning systems
The challenges of current monitoring and warning systems hint
at the many issues that would arise if climate change warnings
become possible and necessary. Attention now to these lessons
may save problems down the line.
The ﬁrst key lesson is the need to understand the intended
audience, and to recognize that the audience may change over
time. This is most clearly brought out in evolution of the hurricane
warning system in the US, as described above, which now serves
both a wide, public audience as well as a highly technical
emergency management audience that understands nuances of
lead time and decision making (Lindell et al., 2007). A less well-
known warning system offers lessons for warning about hazards
that evolve over long periods of time, as would hold for future
climate threats: the Near Earth Object (NEO) survey and associated
Torino Scale (Fig. 2) for potential asteroid impacts on Earth
(Morrison et al., 2004; National Research Council, 2010). The
Torino Scale includes triggers for action to physically intervene
in the threat, as would be needed for geo-engineering. Like some
gauges of volcano risks, the Torino Scale is designed to deal with
multiple threats over long time horizons, and to vary as additional
information is collected about a given, threatening asteroid over
periods of years or even decades, bringing it into the temporal
realm of climate tipping elements. The scale's threat level is a
product of probability of impact and potential effects, based on
size, composition, speed, and likely impact location. The rating of a
particular asteroid might increase or decrease as more information
about it becomes available. The threat is arrayed on a 10-point
scale meant to evoke increasing response as risk escalates: ﬁrst to
instigate more monitoring and analysis and then perhaps actions
to try to prevent the encounter or prepare society for impact. As
such the Torino Scale is a good model for severe and abrupt
climate change: elements of concern, like ice sheet disintegration,
could be codiﬁed and their likelihood and impacts assigned a
threat level to be reﬁned over time as knowledge improves and
monitoring data stream in.
Extant systems also reveal pitfalls of hazard warnings. Early
applications of the Torino Scale had an unnerving tendency to
yield rather high threat levels for newly-discovered near-earth
objects, which were dutifully reported by the media but invariably,
and fortunately, declined as more data were collected. Hurricane
Fig. 2. Some extant early warning schemes are analogous in many ways to the
challenges of severe climate change warnings that might be in place over years or
even decades. The Torino Scale for asteroid threats is used by the US National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as a hazard rating meant to be up-
dated over years or even decades as new data become available on speciﬁc objects.
Available at: http://impact.arc.nasa.gov/torino.cfm. Copyright 1999, 2004 Richard P.
Binzel, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Used with permission.
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strike probabilities as used in the U.S. had something of the
opposite problem: as the hurricane track forecast cone intersected
a coastline, the probabilities were spread out across so many pre-
set coastal segments that the value for any one area remained
quite low, and only rose to what a lay-person might take as
worrisome just before landfall (Baker, 2000, p. 317). Strike fore-
casts were also precluded, by design, from probabilities greater
than 50% until within 24 h of landfall (Sheets, 1985) and that
tended to underwhelm decision-makers. Strike probabilities have
been replaced with wind speed and storm surge probability
forecasts; see Willoughby et al. (2007).
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) experiment with geologic
hazard warnings, ﬁrst for the Long Valley Caldera volcano in
California, threw into question the usefulness of the tiered
watch/warning approach for threats that evolve over years and
decades. Increased seismic activity in Long Valley during the early
1980s led to issuance of the ﬁrst-ever volcano hazard “watch;” but
as the watch dragged on for months without an eruption, and with
the prospect for years of alerts as swarms of small earthquakes
came and went, affected communities worried about impacts on
their economy and the USGS was persuaded to add “stand-down”
criteria so people would not be left hanging in a warning (Hill
et al., 2002). A more nuanced volcano warning system (Fig. 3) now
in use allows for scaling the level of concern up and down as the
threat evolves, and combining ground-based hazards with the
threat to aviation caused by ash.
Some dimensions of a severe climate change early warning
system
Some form of climate change warning will emerge, at least ad
hoc, as researchers increasingly discover, and learn to predict,
changes in the climate system. Given experience with other warning
systems, how might we go about framing a climate change warning,
assess its skill and value, and link the warning to response decisions?
What: the climate element
Climate change warnings are likely to remain rather general for
some time to come, indeed, they may become more general if
couched in a warning system for one over-riding reason: a formal
warning system represents a contract between science and
society, the terms of which require extraordinary care to achieve
a balance between over-warning and under-warning tuned to the
actions society takes in response to the warning, which can be
quite costly and disruptive. Given the dire implications of a
warning of severe or abrupt climate change, the early incarnations
of a formal warning system might be biased toward vague
statements or even type II (false negatives) errors.
The RFC graphic (Fig. 1) covers a wide spectrum of threats,
including short-term events (weather extremes), aggregate
impacts, and “large scale discontinuities”. Some effort is needed
to sort out a logical roster of climate elements and/or events that
might be included in an early warning system. At the most general
level of abstraction, a basic climate change alert systemmight start
with a categorical ranking of climate change severity similar to
other geo-physical scales like the Modiﬁed Mercalli ranking of
earthquakes. Dovers (2009) and Travis (2010) have suggested
levels of climate change severity starting at current variability,
working up through change that exceeds historical experience,
and eventually to levels imposing catastrophic impacts and
requiring transformative adaptation. The Travis (2010) scale is laid
out in ﬁve levels of climate change severity:
(I) Small but statically-signiﬁcant shifts away from the reference
climate;
(II) Palpable changes in the frequency-intensity-duration of cli-
mate events that begin to surpass informal and formal socio-
technical thresholds like ﬂood plain demarcations;
(III) Extreme climate episodes rare in the past become typical;
emergence of new types of extreme climate episodes or
syndromes;
(IV) New climate epochs: Large-scale discontinuities and perma-
nent change in regional climates;
(V) Catastrophic climate change.
Initially, a severe climate change early detection and warning
system should be poised to detect the higher-level threats, III,
IV and V, that take the climate into new domains of impact, while
counting on the extant warnings systems to attend to typical
extremes, even as their frequency changes. Indeed, it may well
make sense to work at ﬁrst to anticipate only the “truly cata-
strophic events” that far out-strip social resiliency (Tierney et al.,
2001, p. 1). Presumably this would include the larger magnitudes
events like those laid out by Schellnhuber et al. (2006), and Lenton
et al. (2008), such as a ﬂip in the Atlantic thermo-haline current
(THC) or rapid deglaciation of Greenland. Such events might also
evoke attempts to intervene physically with geo-engineering.
The population of dangerous climate thresholds and tipping
elements (and their relevant tipping points and regional or global
climate outcomes) is not yet clearly discerned, though roughly a
dozen threats have emerged in the literature (Lenton et al., 2008;
Lenton, 2011) and some half dozen have been treated to very
rudimentary probability assessment (Kriegler et al., 2009); see also
Arnell et al. (2005). Lenton and Schellnhuber (2007) offered a
depiction of eight tipping elements similar to the RFC graphic,
relating the likelihood of tipping to increased GMT.
A challenge for useful early warnings is not just to pin down
the probability of each change, but to down-scale to regional and
local impacts, translated into relevant metrics, like crop yields,
energy demand, and coastal inundation. Well-developed impact
assessment methods exist for conventional climate change, but
how well they will extend to extreme and/or abrupt change
remains to be seen.
When: warning lead time
Characteristic climate change time frames may be the greatest
challenge to an early warning system, though some experience
Fig. 3. The Volcano Warning scheme used by the US Geological Survey, in this case
showing possible combinations of ground-based hazards levels (rows) and possible
ash hazards to aviation (columns) for a speciﬁed volcano. Ground-based hazard
alerts may stay in place over relatively long periods of time while aviation ash
warnings might be changed hour by hour.
More details of the volcano warning system are available at: http://volcanoes.usgs.
gov/activity/alertsystem/icons.php.
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with multi-year and even multi-decade warning is accruing in the
various geological warning systems now in place, such as for
volcanoes and asteroids (e.g., application of the Torino asteroid
threat scale). Several time elements are at play in severe climate
change that might stem from AGW: when would greenhouse
forcing cause certain climate effects? At what lead time might
reliable predictions be available? How fast or slow would those
effects manifest themselves in conditions that impact society, like
extreme droughts, excessive heat, or rapid sea level rise?
A key dimension of early warning is the lead time at which we
could anticipate severe climate shifts with some level of skill
(Scheffer et al., 2009). The challenge is to translate what Lenton
et al. (2008) termed the “policy-relevant” time horizon into lead
times necessary for intervention or adaptation. In decision-
analytic terms, the skill and lead time of predictions, temporal
and spatial proﬁle of the event, and nature of potential responses
all interact to deﬁne a warnings-response space. Useful insights
come from early weather forecast value studies (Thompson, 1963):
trade-offs among warning accuracy and lead time, and the
decisions to be taken, are exacerbated as cost of adaptive
responses, and time needed to implement them, increase. The
problem of critical and costly decisions made on the basis of
uncertain warnings is most well-researched for hurricane evacua-
tion planning (Letson et al., 2007; Gladwin et al., 2009; Lazo et al.,
2010; Regnier, 2008). One lesson from this work seems to be that
uncertain warnings of events with potentially large consequences
evoke risk aversion, and tend the system toward false positives
despite the costs of unnecessary action. Climate warnings, even for
“abrupt” changes, will operate in longer time-frames than weather
warnings, perhaps providing opportunity for responses to be
titrated as conditions evolve (as opposed to the nerve wracking
go/no-go decision in hurricane evacuations), but the potentially
large consequences may also bias decision-makers toward risk
averse decision-making. This point raises again the challenge of
understanding the audience and their use of warnings.
Another lesson from the hazards warning experience is the
value of sorting out types of responses and their sensitivity to
predictive information. This is complicated by the intricate con-
ceptual structure of climate tipping points. By current deﬁnition, a
tipping point is reached when a qualitative change in some crucial
feature of the earth's climate is set in train by a control variable
exceeding a critical value (Lenton et al., 2008). That tipping point
may precede manifestations relevant to society (e.g., damaging sea
level rise or a ﬂip into colder winters or hotter summers) by quite
a long period of time, and the crucial change would proceed in
some transition proﬁle that could be more or less abrupt. Lenton
et al. (2008) conceived of a policy time horizon (Tp) as the
condition in which the control variable and its critical value are
identiﬁable, and the critical value can be accessed by AGW in the
time frame over which policy might mitigate anthropogenic
forcing. But if we wish to apply time-frames of early warning
and response, then Tp might best be elaborated into different
decision frames, perhaps in this ranking:
Tpm (mitigation): the time needed to modify GHG emissions
(decades to half-centuries) to avoid reaching a tipping value;
Tpa (adaptation): the time needed to prepare for (adapt to) the
coming change, e.g., raising sea walls, shifting agricultural
zones, or retreating from the coast (years to decades);
Tpi (intervention): the time needed to deploy geo-engineering
technologies and for them to take effect (months to years).
As Smith et al. (2011) argued, “the decision lifetime interacts
with the nature of the climate change elements to which the
decision is sensitive, as to whether these are changing rapidly or
slowly, and with certainty or not.” (p. 199). Given the likelihood
that climate change forecasts will remain of low skill, indeed, that
some tipping elements would offer pre-cursory lead time and
some would not, it might help to conceive Tpa as including both
warning lead time (say starting when the forecast can be con-
sidered to have achieved half of the theoretically obtainable skill)
and the climate change onset time (say halfway to complete state
change, i.e., tipping half-life). Altogether, this might be referred to
as Tpr: the time available (or needed) to respond to warnings. The
warning time could also be conceived as including a period after
the tipping value is passed but before any signiﬁcant climate
changes are monitored, or impacts accrue.
Available responses interact with lead time. Climate shifts that
would entail very large adaptation effort on a short lead time might
evoke a decision to try both quick adaptation and intervention
(Fig. 4). Shifts that would evoke incremental adaptation efforts over
long lead times might engender a “wait and see” decision posture.
Tpi is even more conditioned by the nature of the response. Some
geo-engineering technologies might be suited to implementation
on evidence that climate forcing is approaching a critical value (go-
on-warning), while others might best be delayed until somewhere
along the tipping proﬁle (go-on-detection). Such decisions would
be sensitive to the scale and reversibility of the climate change and
of the intervention (The Royal Society, 2009; MacCracken, 2007).
Overall, one can hope that Tpr associated with severe and/or
abrupt climate shifts eventually turns out to be sufﬁcient; that
changes requiring the most draconian and time-consuming adap-
tations, or evoking geo-engineering, will work out to be those that
exhibit the longest premonitory time before the onset of damaging
conditions. If we are unlucky, the events that offer the shortest
warning windows will turn out to be those for which the largest
response effort would be needed. The state of science on climate
thresholds, feedbacks, and tipping points precludes pinning down,
with current knowledge, the relevant probability distributions, but
does suggest that several different ﬂavors of thresholds might
emerge, including some with useful precursors and others with
none. Lead time at a given level of skill would probably lengthen
with a longer record of the system (better monitoring could help)
and with the strength of the premonitory indicator (Scheffer et al.,
2009). But the decision-maker is still faced with the trade-off
between type I and II errors in a warn-on-prediction vs. warn-on-
detection response strategy.
Where: location
The geographical focus of forecasts and warnings must be
carefully speciﬁed to be useful. Due to an understandable wish
Fig. 4. Potential responses to warnings about climate shifts interact with lead time.
In the case of anthropogenic global warming, long lead time might logically evoke
stronger policies to mitigate the climate forcing, while shorter lead times would
require immediate adaptation efforts.
W.R. Travis / Weather and Climate Extremes 2 (2013) 31–3836
among forecasters to avoid false negatives, most extant schemes
systematically over-warn. The provision of regional scenarios in
AR4, as reﬂected in the regional Key Impacts charts, is a step
toward localized forecasts and warnings; but the big advance in
resolution and down-scaling needed for useful climate change
warnings is yet to come. Much more focused monitoring is
needed, of speciﬁc ice sheets, ocean currents, and other discreet
climate elements of concern, especially those that might exhibit
threshold behavior (Scheffer et al., 2009; Lenton et al., 2008).
Some of the tipping elements identiﬁed by Lenton et al. (2008)
have something of a deﬁned geographical footprint, but most need
much more research to pin down the teleconnections that would
allow useful warnings for particular regions. Recent mapping of
past and projected temperature extremes begins to provide a basis
for geographically-speciﬁc early warning (Hansen et al., 2012).
Conclusion: next steps in climate change early warning
The premise of this review is that a climate change early
warning system is, in effect, emerging, with little plan or design,
and that lessons from extant hazard warning systems might prove
instructive if warnings about extreme climate change become
necessary. Prospects for effective social response can be improved
by skillful early warning, but experience with current natural
hazard warning systems indicates that effectiveness is not deter-
mined just by predictive accuracy; many other factors play into
warnings usefulness, especially lead time and the available social
response set. Without some care, the emerging ad hoc system may
not readily be molded into effective climate change early warnings
if and when the capability and need arises. The climate science
community could right now usefully emulate the process whereby
astronomers came up with the near-earth asteroid census and
Torino Scale, used to express threat that evolves over years or even
decades. It is too early to start issuing warnings of severe and/or
abrupt climate change, but not too early to sort out how the threat
might be evaluated and communicated as knowledge improves or,
worse, if a threatening climate event becomes likely.
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